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MOLINIST FRANKFURT-STYLE 
COUNTEREXAMPLES AND 
THE FREE WILL DEFENSE 
Michael Bergmann 
Harry Frankfurt's well-known counterexample to the principle of alternate 
possibilities (PAP) has recently come under attack by those who argue that 
the success of that sort of counterexample depends on the falsity of incom-
patibilism. In response, I argue that, given one controversial assumption, 
there are Frankfurt-style counterexamples to PAP that don't take the falsity 
of incompatibilism for granted. The controversial assumption is the 
Molinist one that something like middle knowledge is possible. I then 
show how the falsity of PAP causes some trouble for the Free Will Defense 
standardly offered in response to atheistic arguments from evil. 
Harry Frankfurt has proposed a well-known counterexample to the fol-
lowing principle of alternate possibilities: 
PAP. A person is morally responsible for performing a given act only 
if she could have acted otherwise.! 
One thing that makes Frankfurt's proposed counterexample to PAP inter-
esting is that it is supposed to be successful even if the sort of moral 
responsibility at issue is fairly robust - i.e., of the sort in which an incom-
patibilist and not merely a compatibilist is interested. Recently, however, 
Frankfurt's criticism of PAP has come under attack precisely because it 
(supposedly) fails when the focus is full-blooded moral responsibility of the 
sort that incompatibilists care about.' The suggestion is that such coun-
terexamples to PAP are successful only if one assumes the falsity of inc om-
patibilism. 
In this paper, I will defend Frankfurt's criticism against this charge. My 
aim is to design a Frankfurt-style counterexample to PAP that doesn't take 
for granted the falsity of incompatibilism. According to the sort of incom-
patibilism on which I'll be focusing, freedom and responsibility are incom-
patible with causal determinism and crucially involve agent causation.3 
Philosophers who hold such a view - call them 'incompatibilist agency the-
orists' - typically think of themselves as differing from their compatibilist 
opponents in this way: they believe irt true freedom and genuine responsi-
bility whereas the compatibilists don't (at least not consistently). Thus, the 
particular question I want to consider is this: Is there a Frankfurt-style 
counterexample to PAP that doesn't assume the falsity of the incompati-
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bilist agency theorist's position - a counterexample that focuses on their 
robust notion of moral responsibility? 
The main conclusion of the paper, to be defended in section 2, is that, 
given one controversial assumption, there is a Frankfurt-style counterex-
ample to PAP that doesn't assume the falsity of incompatibilism: The con-
troversial assumption is something very much like the Molinist position 
that middle knowledge is possible (i.e., that there are true would-counter-
factuals of genuine freedom and that these can be known). A secondary 
conclusion, presented in section 3, is that my main conclusion creates a dif-
ficulty for the Free Will Defense standardly offered in response to atheistic 
arguments from evil. But before considering what can be said in support 
of either of these conclusions, we will need to have some idea of what 
Frankfurt's objection is and what problems it is supposed to have. So I 
begin, in section 1, with an account of Frankfurt's counterexample to PAP 
and of two difficulties it must handle. 
1. Two Problems with Frankfurt's Counterexample to PAP 
1.1 Frankfurt's Counterexample to PAP 
Here is Frankfurt's description of his counterexample: 
Suppose someone - Black, let us say - wants Jones to perform a cer-
tain action. Black is prepared to go to considerable lengths to get his 
way, but he prefers to avoid showing his hand unnecessarily. So he 
waits until Jones is about to make up his mind what to do, and he 
does nothing unless it is clear to him (Black is an excellent judge of 
such things) that Jones is going to decide to do something other than 
what he wants him to do. If it does become clear that Jones is going 
to decide to do something else, Black takes effective steps to ensure 
that Jones decides to do, and that he does do, what he wants him to 
do. Whatever Jones's initial preferences and inclinations, then, Black 
will have his way .... Now suppose that Black never has to show his 
hand because Jones, for reasons of his own, decides to perform and 
does perform the very action Black wants him to perform.s 
The key ingredients in the story are an agent who performs the act in ques-
tion without interference and the presence of another agent, the intervener, 
who is prepared to intervene to get his way but who doesn't intervene 
because he doesn't need to in this particular situation. The point of the 
example is to show that PAP is false. For Jones, in the example, is responsi-
ble for performing an action even though he can't do otherwise. 
1.2 The Causatio/1 Problem 
The first problem with Frankfurt's story, from the perspective of at least 
some incompatibilist agency theorists, is that it tells us that the intervener 
(Black) would, under certain circumstances, cause Jones to perform some 
act. The suggestion in the story is that, whether Jones or Black is the cause, 
it is correct to say that Jones performs the act in question. But incompati-
bilist agency theorists (at least some of them) will object to this description 
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of the case in the following way: "It is correct to say that Jones performs the 
act only if Jones is the agent cause of it; if Black causes the act and Jones 
doesn't agent-cause it, then, strictly speaking, it isn't Jones who is perform-
ing the act nor is it an act of Jones's. Furthermore, due to the nature of agent 
causation, it is impossible to cause Jones to agent-cause something. So 
Frankfurt's description of the case is incoherent insofar as it seems to 
assume that it is possible for Black to cause Jones to perform an act." 
The way I'll be thinking of agent causation in this paper is as follows: 
AC. X is the agent cause of e iff each of the following three conditions 
is satisfied: 
1. X is a substance that had the power to bring about e 
2. X exerted its power to bring about e 
3. nothing distinct from X (not even X's character) caused X to 
exert its power to bring about e.6 
Given AC, we can see why it is that the requirement that X be the agent 
cause of e in order for e to be an act of X's leads to the conclusion that no 
intervener can cause X to cause e if e is an act of X'S.7 
1.3 The Prediction Problem 
The other problem with Frankfurt's story is its claim that Black is able to 
predict what Jones will do if Black doesn't intervene. The idea seems to be 
that Black watches Jones carefully, looking for a sign in Jones's behavior 
prior to t that will make it clear whether Jones will do what Black wants 
him to do at t (e.g., attempt to kill Smith). Now suppose there is such a 
sign and it signifies that Jones will try to kill Smith (if there is no interven-
tion). Then presumably the sign would, absent intervention, causally 
determine Jones's attempting to kill Smith. For if it didn't, then Black has 
no guarantee that, after the sign and Black's decision not to intervene, 
Jones won't change his mind and leave Smith alone, much to Black's dis-
may. But if the sign prior to t does causally determine Jones's attempting at 
t to kill Smith, then that event (Jones's attempting at t to kill Smith) is not 
an act for which Jones is responsible. In order for it to be an act for which 
Jones is responsible, Jones must agent-cause it. But if at t Jones agent-caus-
es that event and yet that event is causally determined by the sign Black 
noticed prior to t, then (assuming this isn't a case of causal overdetermina-
tion) Jones's agent-causing at t of that event must be caused by the sign 
Black noticed prior to t. And that cannot be. For, as we've already noted, 
according to AC, Jones can't be caused to agent-cause. 
In short, either Jones's attempt to kill Smith is causally determined by 
the sign or not. If not, then the sign gives Black no guarantee that Jones 
will kill Smith. If it is causally determined, then the event of Jones's 
attempting to kill Smith isn't an act for which Jones is responsible.' 
Obviously, the causation problem and the prediction problem are close-
ly related insofar as both are connected with the fact that it is impossible to 
cause someone to agent-cause. The main difference is that the causation 
problem has to do with what I'll call 'the counterfactual situation' - the one 
that would occur if, contrary to fact, Jones were to refrain from the act -
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whereas the prediction problem has to do with the actual situation in 
which Jones does perform the act. 
1.4 Solving the Causation Problem 
The causation problem can be solved rather easily. What Frankfurt needs 
is a case where the agent can't do otherwise. To guarantee this, we don't 
need to say that the agent in the counterfactual situation is forced to per-
form the act that, in the actual situation, he willingly performs (i.e., we 
don't need to say that the agent is caused to agent-cause what he agent-
causes in the actual situation). All we need to guarantee is that the agent 
can't agent-cause anything other than what he agent-causes in the actual 
situation. And we can guarantee this by saying that Black has the power 
temporarily to take away Jones's powers with respect to the act in ques-
tion. For in that case, Jones can neither perform the act nor intentionally 
refrain from performing it - indeed, Jones will be temporarily unable to 
exercise any powers at all with respect to the act in question. Let's say that 
the act in question is the causing of a volition, VI, to pull the trigger of the 
gun in his hand. And let's say that Black's plan is this. If Black sees that 
Jones is about to cause VI at t, then Black will not intervene. However, if 
Black sees that Jones is about to intentionally refrain at t from causing VI 
(i.e., to cause at t his not causing VI), then Black takes away Jones's powers 
with respect to VI at t (so that Jones can neither cause that volition nor 
cause his not causing it) and Black himself causes VI at U In the counter-
factual situation, Black doesn't cause Jones to agent-cause Vl. Instead, 
Jones's powers to agent-cause with respect to VI have been temporarily 
taken away at t and Black himself causes VVO 
In the case just described, Jones is unable to do otherwise than cause VI 
at t since in the counterfactual situation in which Black takes away Jones's 
powers and causes VI himself, Jones isn't able to do anything with respect 
to Vl. But despite this fact, the causation problem doesn't arise in connec-
tion with this counterfactual situation because there is no suggestion that, 
in that situation, Jones is caused to agent-cause. l1 
However, solving the causation problem doesn't solve the prediction 
problem. We've removed the incoherent causing of agent causation from the 
counterfactual situation but we haven't removed it from the actual situa-
tion. In section 2, I present a Molinist solution to the prediction problem 
and exploit it in giving a Molinist Frankfurt-style counterexample to PAP. 
2. A Molinist Frankfurt-Style Counterexample 
2.1 Molinism and the Prediction Problem 
I don't plan on discussing the views of Luis de Molina. The Molinist fea-
ture of the Frankfurt-style counterexample I'll be proposing is just that it 
will involve something very much like middle knowledge, the possibility 
of which Molina famously endorses. Middle knowledge is knowledge of 
subjunctive conditionals of freedom. Subjunctive conditionals of freedom 
are conditionals of the form If agent X were in circumstances K, X would freely 
do Y. It is controversial whether middle knowledge is possible because it is 
controversial whether there can be true subjunctive conditionals of free-
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dom. Although I acknowledge the controversial nature of the assumption 
that there are true subjunctive conditionals of freedom, I won't make any 
attempt to defend that assumption here. '2 Instead, I will simply argue for 
the conditional conclusion that if there are true subjunctive conditionals of free-
dom, then there is a Molinist Frankfurt-style counterexample to PAP even if 
the notion of moral responsibility in PAP is the robust one favored by the 
incompatibilist agency theorist. Given that it isn't uncommon for incom-
patibilist agency theorists to agree that there are true subjlffictive condi-
tionals of freedom, this conditional conclusion will not be uninteresting. 
The attentive reader will notice that I've said my Molinist Frankfurt-style 
counterexample will involve not middle knowledge but something very 
much like middle knowledge. The difference between the knowledge I have 
in mind and middle knowledge proper is that the knowledge I have in mind 
is of subjunctive conditionals of agent causation - i.e., subjunctive condition-
als of the form If agent X were in circumstances K, X would agent-cause Y where 
agent causation is understood in accord with AC. Given how common it is 
for incompatibilist agency theorists to think agent causation is necessary for 
freedom, it will be natural for them to think the possibility of middle l<nowl-
edge entails the possibility of the sort of knowledge I have in mind. 
The only reason, then, that I call my Frankfurt-style counterexample 
'Molinist' is that it will involve knowledge of subjunctive conditionals of 
agent causation. Nothing more is intended by that name. The suggestion 
that such knowledge is possible is, of course, as controversial as the sug-
gestion that middle knowledge is possible. One reason that doubts about 
the possibility of middle knowledge arise is that to some philosophers it 
doesn't seem possible for subjunctive conditionals of freedom to be true 
unless something other than the agent causes her free actions (in which 
case they aren't free actions). Likewise, one reason that doubts about the 
possibility of knowledge of subjunctive conditionals of agent causation will 
arise is that to many it doesn't seem possible for subjunctive conditionals of 
agent causation to be true unless something other than the agent causes her 
agent-causings (in which case they aren't agent-causings). But middle 
knowledge sympathizers think that a subjunctive conditional of freedom 
can be true of an agent even if nothing distinct from that agent causes her 
free actions. A similar position will be taken by those who think there are 
true subjunctive conditionals of agent causation (this will include, I 
assume, all agency theorists who think middle knowledge is possible). 
They will think that a subjunctive conditional of agent causation can be 
true of an agent even if nothing distinct from that agent causes her agent-
causings. As I said above, I don't want to get into a discussion here of the 
merits of the view that middle knowledge is possible. I simply want to 
point out that the view that there are true subjunctive conditionals of agent 
causation seems to be at least as plausible as the view that there are true 
subjunctive conditionals of freedom. The reason I point this out is to 
emphasize that the Molinist Frankfurt-style counterexample I give below 
(which depends on the possibility of knowledge of subjunctive condlition-
als of agent causation) will be successful if middle knowledge is possible. 
It is, no doubt, obvious by now how Molinism can solve the prediction 
problem. The prediction problem arose because the intervener was sup-
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posed to know in advance what Jones would do if there were no interven-
tion. In knowing prior to t what Jones would do at t if there were no inter-
vention, it seemed the intervener had to have knowledge that some event 
prior to t would cause Jones to perform a certain act at t if there were no 
intervention. But since the act in question is supposed to be agent-caused, 
it is impossible for the intervener to know in this way what Jones would do 
at t. However, if the intervener can have prior knowledge of the subjunc-
tive conditionals of agent-causation true of Jones, then the ability to predict 
what Jones would do at t if there were no intervention is possible after all. 
2.2 The Counterexample Described 
Let's say that t* is a time shortly before t and that the interval of time from 
t* up until t includes t* and all moments after it up until but not including t. 
And let's say that circumstances K include a subset of the features of 
Jones's environment, but not his own behavior. Now suppose the follow-
ing subjunctive conditional of agent causation is true of Jones: 
A. If from t* up until t Jones were in circumstances K and Demon 
didn't take away Jones's powers at t with respect to VI, then Jones 
would agent-cause VI at t. 
And suppose that the intervener isn't Black but Demon, a powerful being 
with knowledge of subjunctive conditionals of agent causation such as A. 
Furthermore, suppose Demon knows (long before t) that Jones will be in 
circumstances K from t* up until t (since Demon plans to arrange for this) 
and Demon is considering whether to take away Jones's powers with 
respect to VI at t. Demon wants VI to occur at t (let's say VI is the volition 
to pull the trigger of the gun in Jones's hand) and would prefer that Jones 
agent-cause VI at t. But, if he knows that Jones won't agent-cause VI at t, 
he will intervene as follows: he will take away Jones's powers at t with 
respect to VI and will cause VI himself at tY Thus, the following subjunc-
tive conditionals are true of Demon: 
B. If A were true, then Demon would know it (long before t) and 
would refrain from taking away Jones's powers at t with respect to VI. 
C. If A were false, Demon would know it (long before t) and would 
take away Jones's powers at t with respect to VI. 
Finally, suppose that, in addition to A-C, it is also true that: 
D. From t* up l.mtil t Jones is in circumstances K and Demon doesn't 
take away Jones's powers at t with respect to VI. 
What can we conclude? 
First, we should note that this is not a case in which Demon observes some 
behavior of Jones's prior to t (such as an inclination to cause VI at t) which 
functions as a sign for Demon that Jones will agent-cause VI at t. The inter-
vener's prediction that Jones will agent-cause VI at t doesn't involve his 
468 Faith and Philosophy 
noticing some behavior of Jones's prior to t that causally determines Jones's 
agent-causing VI at t. Nor does the intervener's prediction involve knowl-
edge of some behavior of Jones's prior to t which counterfactually implies 
without causing Jones's agent-causing VI at t.14 Instead, the intervener"s pre-
diction involves knowledge (long before t) of (a) a true subjunctive condi-
tional of agent causation and (b) the truth of the antecedent of that condition-
al, where that antecedent doesn't describe some behavior of Jones's prior to t 
but rather the circumstances Jones will be in from t* up until and includinglS 
t. Thus, in my example, the intervener (Demon) doesn't need to watch Jones 
carefully as the moment of decision, t, approaches in order to check for some 
sign indicating what Jones would agent-cause at t (absent intervention). 
Demon had what he needed long ago, namely, knowledge of (a) and (b). 
2.3 Why Jones is Responsible for VI 
I now want to argue that the case I've just described in which A-D are true 
constitutes a counterexample to PAP. It will help if we first consider a 
slightly different case in which A and D are true but there is no intervener 
like Demon (so B and C aren't true). In such a case it seems clear that Jones 
is morally responsible for VI. Jones agent-causes VI at t and nothing causes 
him to do SO.16 Clearly the causal buck for VI stops with Jones. Who, then, 
besides Jones could be morally responsible for it? Now suppose we alter 
this case merely by adding to it the existence of Demon of whom B and C 
are true. Demon has plans to intervene under certain conditions. But those 
conditions don't obtain and Demon doesn't intervene. For in this Demon 
case, Jones does exactly what he does in the Demon-less case and he does so 
with absolutely no interference or influence from Demon. It seems that if 
Jones is morally responsible for VI in the Demon-less case, Jones is equally 
morally responsible for VI in the Demon case. After all, there has been no 
intervention. In both the Demon case and the Demon-less case, the causal 
buck for VI stops with Jones. Who but he could be morally responsible for 
VI in such circumstances? Thus, our first conclusion about this Demon case 
is that Jones is morally responsible for VI since in it, just as in the Demon-
less case, the causal buck for VI stops with Jones.17 
2.4 Why Jones Couldn't Do Otherwise Than Cause VI at t 
Our second conclusion about this case in which A-D are true is that Jones 
couldn't do otherwise than cause VI at t. The argument for this conclusion 
has two parts. 'b In part one, I argue, using only necessary truths as premis-
es, that if 
C. If A were false, Demon would know it (long before t) and would 
take away Jones's powers at t with respect to VI 
is true, then it follows that if 
E. From t* up until t Jones is in circumstances K 
is true, it is not the case that 
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F. At t Jones exercises his power to do otherwise than cause VI at t. 
Given that the conditional if E then -F is entailed by C together with some 
necessary truths, we may conclude that it is a necessary truth that if C then 
if E then -F. The second part of the argument uses that conclusion to show 
that, in the circumstances described in my counterexample, Jones couldn't 
do otherwise than cause VI at t. 
Let's tum, then, to part one of the argument in which I argue that, neces-
sarily, if C then if E then -F. My strategy here will be to prove first some-
thing equivalent to the contrapositive of that conclusion - namely, if both E 
and F, then -C - using conditional proof. I will prove that contrapositive 
by assuming E and F and then using indirect proof to establish -C (by 
showing that C leads to a contradiction). 
Assume for conditional proof that E and F are true. Since F guarantees 
the truth of 
G. Demon didn't take away Jones's powers at t with respect to VI, 
we may conclude that G. We may also conclude that 
H. Jones did not agent-cause VI at t 
since F guarantees its truth as well. This gives us the conjunction of E and 
G and H. But it is a necessary truth that if E and G and H are true then it's 
not the case that 
A. If from t* up until t Jones were in circumstances K and Demon 
didn't take away Jones's powers at t with respect to VI, then Jones 
would agent-cause VI at t. 
For A says that if E and G were true then H would be false. So we may con-
clude (still under the assumption made for conditional proof) that A is false. 
Now suppose (for reductio) that 
C. If A were false, Demon would know it (long before t) and would 
take away Jones's powers at t with respect to VI 
is true. Without even considering what A says, we can see that it is a 
necessary truth that if C is true and A is false then G is false (since the 
consequent of C entails the falsity of G). Since we've proved (using the 
assumption for conditional proof) that A is false and we are assuming 
(for reductio) that C, we can use this necessary truth to conclude that G 
is false. But now we have a contradiction: G is both true (we derived it 
earlier from F) and false. Since assuming C leads to a contradiction, we 
may conclude that C is false. And now we may discharge our initial 
assumption (that E and F are both true) and conclude that if E and Fare 
both true, C is false. From this we may easily derive our desired conclu-
sion: if C is true then if E then -F. And since the only premises used 
were necessary truths, we may conclude that necessarily, if C, then if E 
then -F. 
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Before moving on to consider part two of my argument, it will be help-
ful to layout part one in a more formal manner. I'll begin by laying out the 
propositions used in the argument: 
A. If from t* up until t Jones were in circumstances K and Demon 
didn't take away Jones's powers at t with respect to VI, then Jones 
would agent-cause VI at t. 
C. If A were false, Demon would know it (long before t) and would 
take away Jones's powers at t with respect to VI. 
E. From t* up until t Jones is in circumstances K. 
F. At t Jones exercises his power to do otherwise than cause VI at t. 
G. Demon didn't take away Jones's powers at t with respect to VI. 
H. Jones did not agent-cause VI at t 
Now I can layout part one of the argument: 
1. E&F 
2. G 
3. H 
4. E&G&H 
5. If (E & G & H), then-A. 
6. -A 
7. C 
S. If (-A & C), then -G. 
9. -G 
10. G&-G 
11. -C 
12. If (E & F), then-C. 
13. If C, then if E then -F. 
Assume for Conditional Proof 
FromF 
FromF 
From 1-3 
Necessary Truth 
From 4 and 5 
Assume for Indirect Proof 
Necessary Truth 
From6-S 
From 2 and 9 
7-10 Indirect Proof 
1-11 Conditional Proof 
From 12 
Since 13 is derived using only necessary truths as premises, 13 is itself a 
necessary truth. 
Part two of the argument (for the conclusion that, in the counterexample 
I've described, Jones couldn't do otherwise than cause VI) consists of two 
applications of the following principle of inference: 
PI. If (i) (If P then Q) and no matter which of her abilities X exer-
cised at t, it would be the case that (If P then Q) 
and (ii) P and no matter which of her abilities X exercised at t, it 
would be the case that P, 
then (iii) Q and no matter which of her abilities X exercised at t, 
it would be the case that Q. 
PI is very much like the principle Peter van Inwagen calls 'principle Wand 
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the principle John Martin Fischer calls 'the principle of the transfer of pow-
erlessness'.19 But because it is modeled after the principle proposed by 
McKay and Johnson, it, like the principle they call 'b4', is not susceptible to 
the counterexamples that have been proposed to van Inwagen's principle P 
and to the principle of the transfer of powerlessness.20 
The conclusion I want to establish is that, in the counterexample I 
described, Jones couldn't do otherwise than cause VI. Recall that in the 
counterexample I described, each of A-D is true. And since 
D. From t* up until t Jones is in circumstances K and Demon doesn't 
take away Jones's powers at t with respect to VI 
is a conjunction with E as its first conjunct, my counterexample also 
includes the truth of E. Since we are interested in determining what would 
be true if my counterexample were true, I include both E and C as premis-
es in the second part of my argument which proceeds as follows: 
First Application of PI 
14. No matter which of his abilities Jones exercised at t, it would be 
the case that 13. 
15. C 
16. No matter which of his abilities Jones exercised at t, it would be 
the case that C. 
17. :. (If E then ~F) and no matter which of his abilities Jones exer-
cised at t, it would be the case that (If E then ~F). [from 13-16 by 
PI] 
Second Application of PI 
18. E 
19. No matter which of his abilities Jones exercised at t, it would be 
the case that E. 
20. :. No matter which of his abilities Jones exercised at t, it would 
be the case that - F. [from 17-19 by PI] 
As I noted above, premises 15 and 18 are entailed by my description of the 
Demon case. Premise 14 is uncontroversial since everyone agrees that 
nothing Jones can do might result in the falsity of a necessary truth. Thus, 
assuming I'm right in saying that premises 5 and 8 are necessary truths, 
this leaves only premises 16 and 19 to be defended. 
Premise 16 says that no matter which of his abilities Jones exercised at t, 
it would be the case that: 
C. If A were false, Demon would know it (long before t) and would at 
t temporarily take away Jones's powers at t with respect to VI. 
In defense of this premise, all I need to do is make explicit an element of 
the story that is quite naturally taken for granted, namely, that because of 
Demon's superior powers and the firmness of Demon's plans, Jones isn't 
able to bring it about that C is false of Demon. Jones simply lacks that sort 
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of power over Demon's dispositions. Demon is committed to acting in 
accord with C and there is nothing Jones can do about that. 
Premise 19 says that no matter which of his abilities Jones exercised at t, 
it would be the case that: 
E. From t* up until t Jones is in circumstances K. 
One might be inclined to defend this premise using the principle called 'the 
fixity of the past' according to which no one can bring about the falsity of p 
if P is made true by a hard fact about the past.21 But Plantinga has argued 
against this principle by describing scenarios in which a person can bring 
about the falsity of p where p is made true by a hard fact about the past.22 
The key ingredient in his scenarios is a powerful and omniscient being 
who has foreknowledge which it uses as follows. It foreknows that an 
agent X will freely do Y at t and, on the basis of that foreknowledge, it per-
mits some event E at t-n, a time long before X was born. But if it had fore-
known instead that X will not freely do Yat t, it would, on the basis of that 
foreknowledge, have prevented E from occurring at t-n. Since X's doing Y 
at t is free, we may assume that she could at t bring it about that she freely 
refrains from y'23 But then, given the powerful being's plans and fore-
knowledge, X could bring it about that E didn't occur at t-n, despite the fact 
that E's occurring at t-n is a hard fact about the past. 
Suppose Plantinga is right about this. Does that prevent mE' from 
defending premise 19? No. For I can defend it without relying on the fixi-
ty of the past principle to which Plantinga proposes the above C01.mterex-
ample. All I need to do is stipulate that in my Molinist Frankfurt-style 
counterexample to PAP (i.e., the Demon case) there is no powerful and 
omniscient being whose permission of the truth of E is dependent on its 
foreknowledge of something Jones freely does at t. Then I can rely on a 
weakened version of the fixity of the past principle which says that absent 
conditions like those Plantinga describes in his counterexample to the original fixi-
ty of the past principle no one can bring about the falsity of p if P is made 
true by a hard fact about the past. 
The above defense of premises 16 and 19 completes my two-part argu-
ment for the second conclusion about the case in which A-D are true, 
namely, that in that case, Jones doesn't have the ability to do otherwise 
than cause VI at t. 
2.5 Summary 
Now we can combine our two conclusions about the Demon case. TIle first 
conclusion, from 2.3, is that Jones is morally responsible for VI since Jones 
is responsible in the Demon-less case and the Demon case is relevantly 
similar. And our second conclusion, from 2.4, is that Jones can't do other-
wise than cause VI at t. Putting these two conclusions together, we have a 
counterexample to PAP: Jones is morally responsible for causing VI at t 
even though Jones couldn't do otherwise than cause VI at t. Furthermore, 
this counterexample involves a robust notion of moral responsibility 
because the responsibility derives from the fact that Jones is the agent 
cause of VI and, assuming there could be true subjunctive conditionals of 
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agent causation, nothlng in the description of the counterexample conflicts 
with the claim that Jones agent-causes VF4 
It's worth highlighting the fact that in proposing a counterexample to 
PAP, I haven't claimed that ability to do otherwise isn't necessary for free-
dom. My intuitions are fairly strong in support of agent causation, as 
defined in AC, being sufficient for moral responsibility. That's one main 
reason why I think the example I've proposed succeeds (assuming there 
are true subjunctive conditionals of agent causation). But I don't know 
what to say about freedom. When responsibility and ability to do other-
wise come apart, does freedom go with responsibility or with ability to do 
otherwise? I don't have a firm opinion in answer to this question. 
(Perhaps there are two incompatibilist notions of freedom: one that goes 
with responsibility and one that goes with ability to do otherwise.) But 
since I think the claim that ability to do otherwise isn't necessary for freedom is 
at least questionable, I'll assume, for the purposes of this paper, that ability 
to do otherwise is necessary for freedom.25 
3. A Difficulty for the Free Will Defense 
In this final section, I want to spell out an important consequence my coun-
terexample to PAP has for the Free Will Defense. According to the Free 
Will Defense, it is possible that God needs to permit evil in order to obtain 
the good of having significantlt6 free creahlres. For in order to have sig-
nificantly free creatures who do what is right, God must have creatures 
who are able to do evil (assuming that freedom requires the ability to do 
otherwise). And in order for them to be able to do evil, God can't be like 
Demon, the intervener in my Molinist Frankfurt-style counterexample to 
PAP. In particular, God can't have a plan to prevent creaturely acts (by 
temporarily removing their powers with respect to the act in question) if he 
can see via his middle knowledge that, absent such intervention, they 
would freely do evil. If God did have such a plan, then (for the reasons 
noted in section 2) the creatures wouldn't be able to do otherwise and, 
hence, wouldn't be significantly free. Thus, if all possible creaturely 
essences are contingently such that their instantiations would do at least 
one thlng wrong no matter what God did (so long as he instantiated those 
essences with significant freedom), then God must permit evil if he is to 
have significantly free creatures.27 
My purpose isn't to object to the above account of why permitting evil 
might be necessary for having free creatures.28 Instead, I want to challenge 
the assumption that permitting evil is required for obtaining the good that 
makes having free creatures so valuable. Why is it that having free crea-
tures is thought to be so valuable? I think the main reason is the belief that 
if God's creatures weren't free, they couldn't engage in a loving relation-
ship with God. Why not? Because love of the sort God has for us and 
wants from us cannot be caused in a person by anything other than that 
person. God can't force us to love him because love is the sort of thing for 
which the lover has to be responsible. 
But as soon as we put it that way, we can see (in light of the cOlmterexam-
pIe from section 2) that the good that God is after - i.e., our loving him in 
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such a way that we are responsible for it - is compatible with our not being 
able to do otherwise. Perhaps it is true that freedom requires the ability to do 
otherwise. If so, then the good of our being significantly free may require the 
permission of evil. But the Molinist Frankfurt-style counterexample to PAP 
shows that the good of our being responsible for the good things we do - in 
particular, our being responsible for loving God - doesn't require the ability 
to do otherwise. So, if the good that God is after in making us free is our 
being responsible for loving him, then there is no need to make us free (and, 
thereby, risk the moral evil we see around us) in order to get that good. All 
that is required is that we are responsible for loving God. And God can 
arrange for that so long as there are at least some subjunctive conditionals of 
agent causation true of us according to which we agent-cause our love of 
God in certain circumstances.29 Then God can arrange for our being respon-
sible for loving him by placing us in those circumstances. And he can, at the 
same time, prevent us from being able to do otherwise. He can do this by 
being prepared to intervene in the way Demon was prepared to intervene in 
Jones's affairs. The only difference is that, whereas Demon intervenes when 
he knows Jones would agent-cause something other than a particular wicked 
act (i.e., attempting to kill Smith), God intervenes when he sees that we 
would agent-cause something other than an act of love toward God.3D 
But perhaps there is some other good that God can obtain by creating 
free creatures. Perhaps God wants not just the good of our being responsi-
ble for loving him but also some other good for which freedom (with the 
ability to do otherwise it entails) and not merely responsibility is required. 
That may be so. I can't rule it out. However, the point I want to make is 
just that the main reason for thinking that freedom is an important good 
fails to provide God with a good reason to permit evil- or at least it fails if 
PAP is false. For although our being free does make possible our being 
responsible for loving God, our being responsible and unable to do other-
wise does too. This forces proponents of the Free Will Defense to either 
defend PAP (and, of course, one could defend it against my proposed coun-
terexample by arguing against the possibility of middle knowledge) or 
come up with some other explanation for why having free creatures is such 
a valuable thing. Either way, the simple explanation for why freedom is an 
outweighing good that requires the permission of evil (i.e., the fact that it 
makes possible a loving relationship with God) cannot stand on its own.3! 
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